On December 19, 2025, the Avoiding Vexatious Overuse of Impleading to Delay (AVOID) Act (as used in this article, the “Act”) was signed into law. At bottom, the Act limits the timeframes in which third-party actions may be commenced, allegedly to minimize delays resulting from non-meritorious impleader. This stated purpose likely better serves the Act’s strained acronymous name than it does parties to litigation—defendants or plaintiffs.
The Act is an amendment to the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (the “CPLR”) § 1007 entitled “When Third-Party Practice Allowed”. As currently in force, CPLR § 1007 allows liberal impleader; a defendant is permitted to proceed against a non-party who may be liable to that defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim. Furthermore, a defendant may currently proceed in filing its third-party action at any time following commencement of the primary action, as no limitation of time is imposed on the commencement of a third-party action.
Important Provisions of the Act
Under the new subdivision (b) of CPLR § 1007, the commencement of third-party actions will be subject to the following timeframes:
- A defendant will be required to serve a third-party summons and complaint within sixty (60) days after serving an answer upon the plaintiff where such liability arises from contractual relationship.
- A defendant asserting non-contractual causes of action (i.e., common-law contribution or indemnification) must serve a third-party summons and complaint within sixty (60) days of becoming aware that such person is or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of a plaintiff’s claim.
- A third-party defendant must in turn file and serve its summons and complaint against a second third-party defendant within forty-five (45) days after serving its answer.
- A second third-party defendant must in turn file and serve any summons and complaint against a third third-party defendant within thirty (30) days after serving its answer.
- Any subsequent third-party defendant who files its own third-party summons and complaint must do so within twenty (20) days of serving its answer.
A court order will be required for extensions beyond thirty (30) days to the above timeframes. Where a third-party plaintiff seeks to file a third-party summons and complaint more than twelve (12) months after having filed an answer, the third-party plaintiff must seek consent of both the court and the plaintiff. Under subdivision (c), a third-party plaintiff will not be permitted under any circumstances to file a third-party summons and complaint after a note of issue has been filed. A third-party action filed post note-of-issue will be severed or dismissed without prejudice.
Subdivision (d) of the Act, however, contains a carveout section for certain actions against a plaintiff’s employer. The above time periods, DO NOT APPLY where the defendant or third-party defendant seeks to file a summons and complaint against an employer of the plaintiff and either:
- Seeks contribution or indemnification for a grave injury as defined in § 11 of the Workers’ Compensation Law; or
- The employer’s identity had not been known to the defendant or third-party defendant or otherwise identified until after the expiration of the above time periods.
In either case, the defendant or third-party defendant will be required to file and serve a summons and complaint within one hundred twenty (120) days after the later of either of the above events. The Act further provides that actions in violation of Subdivision (d) shall not be allowed to proceed without written consent of both the plaintiff and the court.
Finally, subdivision (e) provides that no motions to consolidate will be permitted with respect to newly filed actions commenced as a result of a third-party action previously being severed from the main action.
Moving Forward
In our estimation, the timeframes imposed by the Act are of questionable value, as it appears most are stripped of effect where the consent of plaintiffs will likely be freely given. It is not apparent why a plaintiff would withhold such consent where impleading only increases the likelihood of recovery. Further unclear is what remedy is available where consent is wrongly denied. Indeed, no grounds for either granting or withholding consent are set forth in the Act.
The Act’s time constraints on third-party practice will now likely lead to the commencement of a slew of third-party actions early on in litigation, as defendants will take a kitchen-sink approach to identifying even potentially liable parties. The Act may simply frontload the very problem it seeks to avoid. Instead of a deliberate (and yes, often protracted) analysis of liability as the case progresses, unnecessary parties will be joined at the initial stages only for the parties to have to untangle themselves by a similarly lengthy and costly process.
The Act, though well-intentioned, will likely serve only to bog down already-overextended courts with motion practice and administrative involvement necessitated by violations of the Act’s filing deadlines. As far as the Act’s animating purpose is concerned, we are unaware that the generous impleader provision of the current CPLR § 1007 is so widely abused so as to warrant the Act’s detailed constraints. It is an unavoidable (read: mandatory play on words) reality facing counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants: The determined litigant will always find a way to weaponize procedure to cause delay. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Act aims to safeguard against meritless claims, we can only hope it is a wild success.
The Act goes into effect on April 20, 2026, and will apply to cases pending on or after that date. The Act’s provisions, however, will not apply to any third-party actions filed and served prior to the Act’s effective date. With that in mind, parties to pending lawsuits should carefully consider any possible third-party actions which might need to be commenced well in advance of this effective date in order to avoid any possible preclusion thereafter. The attorneys at Costello, Cooney & Fearon, PLLC are available to address any concerns about the impact the Act may have on pending cases or potential third-party claims.
